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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2012, the United States Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and again faced the 
question of whether colleges and universities can consider race as a factor 
in admissions decisions to benefit minorities and enhance diversity.
1
 As 
was true when the Court last considered this issue in Grutter v. Bollinger
2
 
in 2003, the central question for the Justices was whether colleges and 
universities have a compelling interest in having a diverse student body.
3
 
As I read the paper by Martin Redish and Mathew Arnould,
 4
 I wondered 
how they would have the Court go about answering that question. 
 Ultimately, the issue comes down to a value choice by the Justices: Is 
diversity in the classroom a compelling government interest? Yet Redish 
and Arnould say that we should not have a system where “judges are 
allowed to insert their own values in place of democratically sanctioned 
choices.”5 But how can a judge possibly decide whether diversity is a 
compelling interest without making a value choice? The text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its assurance of equal protection do not 
provide an answer. The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
offers no clear resolution, at least in terms of whether diversity is a 
compelling interest. Nor do I see how Redish and Arnould’s “controlled 
activism” offers an alternative to the Justices simply having to decide 
                                                                                                                     
  Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
 1. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 12, 2012). 
 2. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in 
having a diverse student body and may consider race as a factor in admissions decisions to enhance 
diversity). 
 3. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 216–18. 
 4. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, 
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1485 (2012). 
 5. Id. at 1522. 
1
Chemerinsky: The Elusive Quest for Value Neutral Judging: A Response to Redish
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1540 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
whether colleges and universities have a sufficiently important interest in 
diverse student bodies. 
 This example is telling because it is so typical. In constitutional cases 
involving equal protection or individual rights, courts always have to 
decide whether, depending on the level of scrutiny, there is a “legitimate,” 
or an “important,” or a “compelling” government interest. The answer to 
this question can never be found in the text of the Constitution and rarely, 
if ever, from the Constitution’s original meaning. The Court has never 
articulated criteria for deciding what is a “compelling” or an “important” 
interest. It is simply a value choice that Justices and judges have to make. 
 There are many places where the text of the Constitution requires that 
judges at all levels make value choices. The Fourth Amendment, for 
example, prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures. But there is no 
way to decide what is reasonable based on the text of the Fourth 
Amendment and there is rarely a way to decide what is reasonable based on 
its original meaning. Nor does the controlled activism approach proposed 
by Redish and Arnould provide a method to answer this. 
 Redish and Arnould say that the debate over constitutional 
interpretation is between two approaches: originalism and nontextualism. 
They do a masterful job of pointing out the flaws of each. They then say 
that they have a better alternative: controlled activism. 
 In this response, I want to make three points: First, Redish and Arnould 
set up a straw person by defining the alternative methods of constitutional 
interpretation as being a choice between originalism and nontextualism. 
Second, Redish and Arnould seek an impossible goal: avoiding judicial 
value choices in constitutional interpretation. Their controlled activism 
approach, like all approaches, fails to avoid these value choices. Finally, I 
suggest that the underlying problem with Redish and Arnould’s analysis is 
the one that plagues so much of constitutional theory: It asks the wrong 
questions. 
I.  A FALSE CHOICE 
Redish and Arnould begin with the premise that there are two leading 
approaches to constitutional interpretation: originalism and nontextualism. 
They state: “[A]t the risk of oversimplification, it is reasonable to posit 
predominant the existence of two major theoretical camps: originalism and 
nontextualism.”6 Originalism is the view that the Constitution’s meaning 
was fixed when it was adopted and can be altered only by constitutional 
amendment and not by interpretation. Redish and Arnould explain the 
various versions of originalism, but all are united by a view that the judges 
in interpreting the Constitution are confined to ascertain and follow its 
original meaning. 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Id. at 1487. 
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 The alternative model, according to Redish and Arnould, is espoused 
by “those scholars and jurists who believe that the Constitution’s text 
should not restrict the judiciary in the exercise of the judicial review 
power.”7 They say that “at its core nontextualism represents either a form 
of linguistic deconstruction—what we term ‘linguistic chaos’—or the 
notion of an ‘unwritten’ constitution grounded in foundational moral 
premises drawn from one or another form of natural law.”8 
 Redish and Arnould persuasively show how both of these two 
alternatives are unacceptable. But the problem with their analysis is that 
they have set up a straw person by presenting these as the two competing 
theories of constitutional interpretation. Neither reflects what the Supreme 
Court has ever done in constitutional decision making. Few Justices in 
history other than Justices Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas have been 
originalists, and even they tend to be originalists only when it serves their 
purposes. For example, there is a very strong argument that the original 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was to allow race-conscious 
programs to benefit minorities.
9
 Yet Justices Scalia and Thomas ignore this 
in consistently voting to invalidate all affirmative action programs. Along 
the same lines, it is difficult to see how the original meaning of the First 
Amendment was to allow corporations to spend unlimited amounts of 
money in election campaigns.
10
 
 In fact, often the Supreme Court has expressly rejected originalism. In 
Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, almost eighty years ago, the 
Court declared: 
It is no answer to say that this public need was not 
apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision 
of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must 
mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what 
the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-
day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the 
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the 
framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would 
have placed upon them, the statement carries its own 
refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception 
that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning—
“We must never forget that it is a constitution we are 
expounding” . . . “a constitution intended to endure for ages to 
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of 
                                                                                                                     
 7. Id. at 1512. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious 
Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 479–80 (1998). 
 10. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899, 924–25 (2010) (holding that corporations 
have the right to spend unlimited sums in independent expenditures in election campaigns). 
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human affairs.” When we are dealing with the words of the 
Constitution, . . . “we must realize that they have called into 
life a being the development of which could not have been 
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. . . . 
The case before us must be considered in the light of our 
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a 
hundred years ago.”11 
Similarly, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court stated:  
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider 
public education in the light of its full development and its 
present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in 
this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools 
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
12
 
 This, of course, is not to deny the role of originalism among 
conservative scholars and Justices. But it is a mistake to believe that the 
Supreme Court has consistently followed originalism over the course of 
American history. 
 Nor do the Justices or many scholars, however, endorse what Redish 
and Arnould term nontextualism. Where the text is clear, virtually all agree 
that it has to be followed. The Constitution requires two Senators from 
each state
13
 and that the President be at least thirty-five years old
14
 and that 
there be a two-thirds vote of the Senate to ratify a treaty.
15
 I cannot think of 
an instance where a Justice said that a textual provision can be ignored, and 
few scholars take the radical deconstructionist position that Redish and 
Arnould identify as the alternative to originalism. 
In fact, the example that Redish and Arnould give of the Court ignoring 
the text of the Constitution, the Eleventh Amendment, does not support 
their conclusion.
16
 They are right, of course, that the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment only keeps a state from being sued by citizens of other states 
and citizens of foreign countries. But the Supreme Court has said that it is 
a larger principle of sovereign immunity, of which the Eleventh 
Amendment is only a part, that precludes states from being sued by their 
own citizens.
17
 In other words, even in this instance, the Supreme Court is 
                                                                                                                     
 11. 290 U.S. 398, 442–43 (1934) (internal citations omitted). 
 12. 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 14. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 15. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 16. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1523. 
 17. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748–49 (1999) (holding that states cannot be 
sued in state court because of a larger principle of sovereign immunity). 
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not ignoring the text of the Constitution—it is supplementing it by finding 
in the Constitution’s structure a principle of state sovereign immunity. I 
share the view of Redish and Arnould that this is wrong, but not because it 
ignores the text of the Constitution; it is wrong because state sovereign 




 Redish and Arnould argue that Bolling v. Sharpe,
19
 which held that 
equal protection applies to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is “textually impermissible.”20 They 
are right, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause applies only to state and local governments. But they never explain 
why it is impermissible to read the Due Process Clause as including a 
requirement for equal protection. In fact, if their approach to constitutional 
interpretation means that equal protection does not apply to the federal 
government, that, by itself, would make it unacceptable. Neither Justices 
nor scholars should accept an approach to constitutional interpretation that 
leads to such an undesirable result as the federal government being 
unconstrained by any requirement of equal protection. 
 The Supreme Court has never said that it is ignoring the text of the 
Constitution or engaging in the radical deconstruction that Redish and 
Arnould describe as nontextualism. Few scholars endorse it. Virtually all 
agree that there are clear provisions of the Constitution and that these 
should be followed, though these provisions are rarely the ones that lead to 
litigation; the Supreme Court is virtually always dealing with the open-
textured provisions of the Constitution. 
 My point is that neither originalism nor nontextualism explains what 
the Supreme Court has actually done throughout American history. By 
presenting these as the two competing models of constitutional 
interpretation, Redish and Arnould create a pair of straw persons that they 
then masterfully demolish. What has the Court done in deciding 
constitutional cases? Throughout American history, the Court has 
considered text, original understanding (if it can be discovered), tradition, 
precedent, and contemporary values and needs. This is how the Court 
decided Brown v. Board of Education,
21
 a case that I assume Redish and 
Arnould applaud; and Roe v. Wade,
22
 a case that Redish and Arnould 
believe was wrongly decided.
23
 In Roe, the Court followed decades of 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 
(2001). 
 19. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that equal protection applies to the federal government 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 20. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1524. 
 21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 23. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1532. 
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precedent in holding that privacy is a fundamental right implicit in the 
word liberty in the Due Process Clause and explained why laws prohibiting 
abortion infringed this right.
24
 In almost every case, there is no clear, 
determinate answer to constitutional questions; the Justices look at 
multiple sources and decide what they believe the Constitution means. 
They are following neither originalism nor nontextualism. Redish and 
Arnould begin with a false premise as to the competing methods of 
constitutional interpretation. 
II.  THE INEVITABILITY OF VALUE CHOICES 
A central aspect of Redish and Arnould’s objective is developing an 
approach to constitutional interpretation that minimizes judges’ making 
value choices in interpreting the Constitution. They say in their 
introduction, “If we ultimately conclude that neither the Constitution’s text 
nor its history restrains unrepresentative, unaccountable judges in checking 
the actions of the political branches of either federal or state governments, 
little will be left of our system of popular sovereignty.”25 They decry 
“situation[s] in which judges are allowed to insert their own values in place 
of democratically sanctioned choices.”26 
But as Redish and Arnould recognize, the text rarely provides answers 
in constitutional cases before the Supreme Court, and the search for an 
original meaning is futile and misguided. That has been so throughout 
American history and yet “our system of popular sovereignty” has 
survived. As they acknowledge, there is often no choice but for the Justices 
to make value choices. They write: “To the extent not prohibited by the 
modest exclusionary textualism filter imposed by our model, we cede to 
the reviewing court a significant degree of discretion to shape 
constitutional interpretation in accord with what they deem normatively 
preferable values. We cede this authority, because there exists no real 
alternative.”27 
I completely agree. In this sentence, they concede that the premise 
stated in their introduction—that popular sovereignty cannot survive 
judicial value imposition—is just wrong. They concede that judges 
inescapably will “insert their own values in place of democratically 
sanctioned choices.”28 
But they are not comfortable with this conclusion, so they develop a 
further theory which they “label Level I and Level II forms of normative 
                                                                                                                     
 24. I defend the reasoning of Roe in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON 
THE CONSTITUTION 170–71 (2010). 
 25. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1586. 
 26. Id. at 1522. 
 27. Id. at 1530–31. 
 28. Id. at 1521. 
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inquiry.”29 They say that “it is solely the Level I form of normative analysis 
that is properly vested in the unaccountable judiciary.”30 I confess that I 
struggled to understand the difference between these two forms of 
normative analysis. They say that a “court employing Level II analysis asks 
only how its chosen constitutional interpretation of a particular provision 
alters the political topography in the manner most consistent with the 
chosen sub-constitutional political or ideological preferences.”31 They say 
that “[u]nder a Level II approach, therefore, constitutional interpretation 
amounts to nothing more than a strategic extension of the interpreter’s 
political agenda.”32 
 By contrast, they say that “[w]hile Level I analysis authorizes 
normative discretion, the normative inquiry applies solely to a 
determination of the values deemed to underlie a linguistically ambiguous 
constitutional provision, divorced from the judge’s narrow, personal 
political preferences or assessment of immediate political consequences.”33 
They say that in following this approach, “courts may choose from a 
variety of plausible interpretations of numerous constitutional provisions. 
But in doing so, they must choose an underlying value framework which is 
both linguistically plausible and grounded in considerations that are 
something other than naked political or ideological precepts.”34 
The problem with the Redish and Arnould approach is that it assumes 
that it is possible to identify the underlying value of a constitutional 
provision or reason from it without the Justice’s ideology playing a crucial 
role. Put another way, every Justice believes that he or she is engaged in 
what Redish and Arnould call Level I analysis. Every Justice, in every 
case, believes that she is identifying the values underlying an ambiguous 
constitutional provision and reasoning from it; no Justice believes that she 
is just imposing a political agenda. Every judicial opinion is written in this 
way. No Justice believes that she is basing decisions on “naked political or 
ideological precepts.” Under the Redish and Arnould approach, we can call 
the decisions we don’t like “impermissible” Level II reasoning, but the 
Justices and the defenders of their opinions will say that they were engaged 
in the Level I approach. There is no way to tell the difference between a 
decision that is based on the Justices reasoning from values they find 
underlying constitutional provisions and a decision that is based on the 
Justices’ imposition of their own values in the Constitution’s name. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 29. Id. at 1531. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1532. 
 34. Id. at 1533. 
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 Redish and Arnould give three examples of cases that they believe 
exemplify impermissible Level II analysis
35
: District of Columbia v. 
Heller,
36
 Roe v. Wade,
37
 and Lochner v. New York.
38
 But all three can be 
seen as exercises of Level I analysis. In Heller, the Court engaged in a 
“determination of the values deemed to underlie a linguistically ambiguous 
constitutional provision.”39 The Second Amendment’s text is an enigma; it 
says: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”40 What is the relationship between the first half of the 
provision, which seemingly states its purpose, and the second half that 
states the right? What does “militia” mean? What does “keep and bear 
arms” mean? The Court in interpreting this provision said that the 
provision’s underlying value was to allow people to have arms in their 
homes for the purpose of self-protection.
41
 This seems exactly what Redish 
and Arnould say that Level I analysis entails. Of course, the reason the 
majority reads this as the purpose, but the dissent does not, is the 
ideological difference between the Justices. We are at a time in history 
when conservatives believe that the Second Amendment protects a right of 
individuals to have guns, but liberals do not. But that points to the 
incoherence of trying to separate Level I from Level II analysis; inevitably 
the values that a Justice finds underlying a constitutional provision are a 
product of that Justice’s views and ideology. 
 Roe v. Wade is no different. The Court interpreted the word liberty in 
the Due Process Clause as protecting the right to privacy.
42
 This was not a 
radical notion. The Court has protected aspects of autonomy under the 
liberty of the Due Process Clause since the early twentieth century. Among 
other rights, the Roe Court noted, the Court has found that the Due Process 
Clause protects a right to marry, a right to procreate, a right to custody of 
one’s children, a right to control the upbringing of one’s children, and a 
right to purchase and use contraceptives.
43
 In other words, the Court found 
that a value underlying the ambiguous word liberty was personal autonomy 
in crucial life decisions. The Court in Roe reasoned from this to say that 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Id. at 1532. 
 36. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 38. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 39. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1532. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 41. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 584–86. 
 42. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53. 
 43. See id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (custody and 
care of children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Soc’y of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (control over upbringing)). 
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laws prohibiting abortion infringed the right to privacy.
44
 
Ultimately, the Court had to decide whether the State’s claimed interest 
in protecting fetal life and pregnant women’s health justified the law 
forbidding abortion.
45
 But this inevitably entailed a value choice by the 
Justices. 
 Again, the Court’s approach in Roe seems a paradigm of what Redish 
and Arnould call Level I analysis. It is easy for critics to say that the Court 
was engaging in no more than imposing its own values and thus really was 
taking a Level II approach. Under the Redish and Arnould model, we will 
all call the decisions we do not like “Level II reasoning.” But other than 
giving us a new way of describing decisions with which we disagree, 
Redish and Arnould have accomplished little. 
 Even Lochner v. New York can be defended as an exercise of Level I 
analysis. The Court interpreted the ambiguous word liberty in the Due 
Process Clause as including freedom of contract.
46
 In other words, to use 
the words of Redish and Arnould, the Court determined “the values 
deemed to underlie a linguistically ambiguous constitutional provision.”47 
The Court in Lochner stated: ‘‘The general right to make a contract in 
relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The right to purchase or to sell labor is 
part of the liberty protected by this amendment.’’48 The Court did exactly 
what Redish and Arnould call for: It candidly identified the value that it 
saw underlying a linguistically ambiguous constitutional provision and 
reasoned from it.  
 Redish and Arnould say that “a judge could disguise her Level II values 
as part of what purports to be a Level I inquiry.”49 But this misses the 
point: Level I analysis, by Redish and Arnould’s own admission, requires 
that Justices identify the values underlying a constitutional provision.  
Inescapably, this is a product of the Justice’s own values and ideology. 
Every Justice believes that he or she is engaged in Level I analysis and 
every opinion is written this way. We just call the ones we do not like 
“Level II,” much like people use “judicial activism” to label the decisions 
they do not like. 
 Moreover, even after the Court identifies a right, it still has to decide 
whether the government has a sufficient interest in interfering with it. 
Depending on the level of scrutiny, the Court must decide whether there is 
a “legitimate” or “important” or “compelling” interest. Inevitably—as 
                                                                                                                     
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 162–63. 
 46. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54. 
 47. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 48. 
 48. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
 49. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1534. 
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argued in the Introduction—this requires a value choice, and the distinction 
between Level I and Level II offers no assistance. 
III.  WRONG QUESTIONS YIELD WRONG ANSWERS 
Almost thirty years ago, Professor Bruce Ackerman observed that 
“[h]ardly a year goes by without some learned professor announcing that 
he has discovered the final solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, 
or, even more darkly, that the countermajoritarian difficulty is insoluble.”50 
Redish and Arnould have now offered their effort to do so. 
Like so much of the constitutional theory of the last half century, they 
seek to minimize judicial value imposition and expressly endorse 
constitutional decision making based on “neutral principles.”51 But there is 
no way to avoid judges having to make value choices. Is a sentence of life 
in prison with no possibility of parole for the crime of shoplifting $153 
worth of videotapes “cruel and unusual punishment”?52 Are clergy-
delivered prayers at a public school graduation a violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
53
 Is the government’s 
interest in preventing corporate wealth from distorting the election process 
a sufficiently compelling interest to justify restricting independent 
expenditures by corporations in elections?
54
 
All of these examples, and they are typical of constitutional cases, 
require that the Justices make value choices. There is no alternative. 
Constitutional theories, like that of Redish and Arnould, are developed to 
try to prevent or limit Justices from doing so. If the question is, can we 
devise an acceptable method of constitutional interpretation that does not 
rest on judicial value imposition, the answer will be, never. 
The inquiry is not only futile—it is destructive. The discussion should 
be about the content of the values and how they should be applied in 
particular cases. What was wrong with Lochner and Heller was not that 
they rested on value choices by the Justices, but that the Court chose 
wrongly. That is the conversation we should be having—a substantive 
conversation about the content of the values and how they should be 
                                                                                                                     
 50. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 
1013, 1016 (1984); see also Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516 
(1981) (“We have seen an extraordinary amount of talent deployed to reconcile judicial review and 
democracy.”); Gerald Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots, and 
Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 817, 828 (“There is an outburst of writing about legitimate modes 
of constitutional interpretation and about limits on judicial subjectiveness and open-endedness.”). 
 51. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1534. 
 52. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003) (denying habeas corpus relief for this 
sentence as a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment). 
 53. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598–99 (1992) (holding that clergy-delivered prayers 
in public school graduations violate the Establishment Clause). 
 54. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 924–25 (2010) (holding that corporations 
have the right to spend unlimited sums in independent expenditures in election campaigns). 
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applied. Focusing on methodology, and Level I and Level II analysis, is an 
undesirable diversion that keeps us from focusing on the real questions that 
should be discussed and debated. 
Over twenty years ago, I wrote: “Ultimately, the decisions must be 
defended or criticized for the value choices the Court made. There is 
nothing else.”55 Of course, Redish and Arnould are right that the text of the 
Constitution must be followed. They are correct that original meaning 
cannot be the basis for decisions. But they err when they try to develop 
their own approach for limiting judicial value imposition. 
CONCLUSION 
There will always be something uncomfortable about unelected judges 
striking down the choices of elected government officials. But judicial 
review is based on the assumption that as a society we are better off having 
judges who are largely insulated from majoritarian politics deciding the 
meaning of the Constitution and being able to strike down the acts of the 
other branches of government. When judges do this, they must make value 
choices. Any attempt to deny this—whether it is called originalism, or 
Level I and Level II analysis, or neutral principles—is doomed to fail and 
keeps us from focusing on the real questions: What values are protected by 
the Constitution, and how should they be applied? 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing 
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 104 (1989). 
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